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1. Summary  
1.1 CCS on electricity and industry is vital if the UK is to achieve cost-
effective decarbonisation in 2030 and 2050. CCS can also store CO2 
from the atmosphere to achieve climate stabilisation.  
1.2 The UK is failing to deliver on its potential for CCS. Past momentum has 
been lost, policy ambition has been reduced, and high quality projects 
have been cancelled. 
1.3 The current package of the UK CCS Commercialisation Programme, 
plus Electricity Market Reform (EMR), plus emissions waivers is at 
extreme risk of repeating past failings. An overly narrow focus, with slow 
‘delivery’ of one or at most two projects this decade will not succeed 
in achieving even DECC’s own limited stated aims for the 
Commercialisation Programme and CCS roadmap. 
1.4 Rapid progress occurring in the USA, Canada, and China, highlights 
that additional attention must be given to parallel enabling actions.  
1.5 Actions are required to build pipeline and shipping infrastructures for 
broader CCS deployment and cost reduction; and to take liability for 
stored CO2. Special action is needed to commercialise storage, and to 
enable CO2 import and CO2-EOR. CCS Certificates can enable parity 
between industry and power, large and small plant, in enacting CCS. 
1.6 Successful results need to focus on timely partnership, not assessment, 
enabling better connections within DECC, and across HM Government.  
2. About SCCS 
2.1  Scottish Carbon Capture and Storage (SCCS) is the largest carbon 
capture and storage research group in the UK. With internationally 
renowned researchers and state-of-the-art facilities, we are unique in 
our connected strength across the full CCS chain, ranging from 
capture engineering and geoscience to public engagement, policy 
and economics. Founded in 2005, SCCS works with universities and 
researchers across Scotland. SCCS is funded by the Scottish Funding 
Council (SFC) and the Energy Technology Partnership (ETP). 
2.2 SCCS highlights three areas, believed to be of particular importance 
for the Committee’s consideration:  
• The experience of past and present UK efforts to procure CCS 
projects via competitive processes, and the practical limitations on 
CCS investment stemming from the current approach to EMR. 
Mandatory CCS Certificates may be applied across the EU. 
• Comparative approaches being undertaken in other countries, 
and implications for UK policy.  
• The need for practical actions on storage and transport, with a 
vision of future CO2 tonnage, to secure CCS deployment in the UK. 
2.3 SCCS can provide impartial evidence on these or other questions.  
3 
 
3. UK CCS projects – past, present and future? 
3.1 CCS in the UK emerged in 1996, when Norway started to inject CO2 for 
storage. In 2003 the first commercial evaluation was made 
(Grangemouth-Forties), in 2005 CCS became G8 policy, in 2007 the UK 
first competition started, and in 2013 the UK is still at least 4 years away 
from its first project. The UK still has the best combination of geological, 
engineering, industrial and academic capabilities in the whole of 
Europe, together with a professed policy commitment to reduce CO2 
emissions and the foundational legislative framework required for CO2 
storage. This confluence of factors has succeeded in attracting the 
proposals of over 50% of Europe’s CCS projects. But this enthusiasm has 
now been stifled via repeated bureaucratic ‘competition’ processes. 
3.2 While other EU member states have focused efforts on individual 
projects, the UK has been unique in operating a formal and 
bureaucratic process, which is named “competition”, but is actually a 
national procurement. This has proven to be slow, demoralising, 
inaccurate and ineffective at delivering a result. 
3.3 Since 2007, commercial CCS projects in the UK have been mired in 
government bureaucracy, stifled by immensely detailed and slow 
examination of “competition” proposals. Requirements to tender for 
funding support have been more effective at killing off projects and 
frustrating international project consortia than they have been at 
securing investment. The current commercialisation programme could 
have secured a ‘pipeline’ of projects for the coming decade in pursuit 
of the stated outcome of cost-competitive CCS. This is now at risk.  
3.4 The Commercialisation Programme saw a speedy beginning but now 
faces a drawn out process before funding can be confirmed for none, 
one, or both of the preferred projects (Peterhead and White Rose).  
3.5 The inclusion of Contracts for Difference for CCS within EMR should in 
theory provide a route to market for these and other well-developed 
projects, but insufficient details have been provided. It appears that 
CCS pricing is bottom of the list for DECC, compared to a diverse 
portfolio of renewables producing intermittent generation, new-build 
nuclear power which appears likely to be extraordinarily expensive, 
and permission for unabated gas – which removes any driver for CCS. 
3.6 The outcome to date is that there appears to be no visible prospect of 
any further CCS projects accessing CfDs during the first period of the 
Levy Control Framework out to 2021. Competition is the ultimate intent 
of EMR – but seems at present to be not an available option. 
3.7 This means that the reserve projects (Teesside and Captain) and the 
previously de-selected (but still EU-funded) Don Valley project have no 
current means of accessing financial support and are at severe risk of 
cancellation. 
3.8 The UK currently plans to support development of just one, perhaps 
two, commercial projects. These will start operation no earlier than 
2017, and possibly several years later, to deliver about 0.8 to 1.0 GW of 
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generation capacity.  
3.9 Fitting CCS to the majority of existing, and projected future new-build, 
fossil fuel plant, will be limited by the practical build-rate. That can be 
estimated from prior experience in the 1990s “dash for gas”.  
3.10 Calculating back from the 2030 target shows that at least 5 GW of CCS 
generation capacity should be operating by 2020, as shown in Figure 1 
below. Storage capacity must be identified to commercial quality 
standard before each of these projects commences. Consequently it is 
necessary to prove about 3 Gigatonnes of CO2 storage for decisions in 




3.11 For any of the three next best placed projects to continue, the 
developers need to have clear sight of the CfD value, running hours, 
and timescale. This has been persistently not available during the past 
12 months, and consequently these project teams have been, and 
continue to be, progressively dismantled.  
3.12 If these three dormant projects were enacted rapidly, by means of CfD 
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decisions, or even strongly worded letters of comfort, then the UK 
would immediately be back on track towards 5GW CCS construction 
by 2020, giving learning cycles and cost reduction to help full CCS 
rollout by 2030. 
The current lack of planning, and especially lack of action, for what 
happens to complementary projects during and after the CCS 
competition seems destined to produce a very small number of 
expensive tests, which have minimal connection towards incentivising 
and developing a new CCS industry in the UK.  The UK should also be 
aware that the EU may enact some CCS-Certificate support 
mechanism to surmount the EU-ETS, that may not fit well with UK-centric 
policies. 
3.13 Urgent attention is required to secure a positive outcome from both 
the Commercialisation Programme and EMR. Lessons of speedy 
delivery have not been learned over recent years. Further barriers that 
need to be addressed include: 
i) uncertain political policy, uncertain long term CO2 ownership 
liability, silence on a stored tonnage of CO2 ambition for 2030  
ii) lack of will to allocate grant funding for first projects,  
iii) catastrophically slow decision-making during DECC evaluations;  
iv) lack of secure high carbon price to signal future CCS market;  
v) lack of secure access to CfD payments to attract developers to 
invest in UK. 
3.14 Beyond the commercialisation programme, the UK does not currently 
have a credible plan to secure the wider deployment of CCS on key 
industrial sectors. Neither does it have a strategy for accelerating the 
enabling infrastructure of CO2 transport and storage that will be 
required for cost reduction, de-risking of investments, and the 
achievement of economies of scale. A proactive approach that seeks 
to use existing low-cost, high-value sources of CO2 (SCCS research) as 
a means of developing transport and storage is urgent and essential. 
This will require the Office of CCS within DECC to proactively link 
between Government Departments. 
3.15 CCS has several important applications outside of electricity. Cleanup 
of CO2 emissions associated with natural methane could be 
undertaken (e.g. Morecambe Bay), whilst storage of atmospheric CO2 
for climate mitigation also requires guaranteed subsurface storage. 
CO2-Enhanced Oil Recovery can produce more oil whilst storing CO2 
(SCCS research). These fundamental sectors are unfunded.   
4. CCS progress elsewhere 
4.1 It would appear at first glance that the UK fares no worse than other EU 
member states in its failure to deliver CCS projects. However in reality 
the UK is only winning in respect of not having grasped its opportunities, 
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and to have seen more projects cancelled than the rest of Europe put 
together. This is not a good advertisement for the UK being the ‘first 
choice for investment in CCS’ with four large projects that the coalition 
government initially claimed to be aiming for. 
4.2 Beyond Europe, efforts on CCS are now showing practical progress in 
the USA, in Canada, and China. The failure of European multi-party 
funding mechanisms and carbon pricing means that Europe may now 
lag 10 years behind in its ability to construct and utilise CO2 transport 
and storage infrastructures and geologies. This will have consequent 
impacts on EU ability to develop profitable new technologies and 
retain industrial production capacity. 
4.3 In Australia, the lack of a stable policy has failed to develop 
commercial projects at the scale previously envisaged. Policy 
uncertainty, combined with equivocation of funding, is most like the UK. 
A world leading research industry has however been developed with 
CO2CRC forming and funding University industry partnerships. 
Additionally, the Gorgon LNG project (the world’s largest) is integrating 
CO2 capture and storage from gas processing operations. This points 
again to the benefit of encouraging low-cost, high-value CCS projects. 
4.4 The USA has been most successful in progressing CCS from concept, 
through research, to commercial reality. The Department of Energy 
formulated a multi-year strategic plan: 
• Phase I commenced with basic research on capture technologies 
coupled to continent-wide evaluation of geological storage.  
• Phase II moved to small scale capture test plant coupled to forming 
of regional geographic partnerships to promote detailed 
evaluation and drilling of storage sites, linked to planned CO2 
transport networks.  
• Phase III, now, has constructed full-scale capture plant at several 
industrial sites and is in the final stages of consenting capture at 
existing and new build coal power plant, linked to multi-million 
tonne full-scale injections into deep geological storage.  
4.5 Crucial differences between the USA CCS process and the UK are:  
• bottom-up innovation and creativity by companies to find solutions 
has been encouraged;  
• realistically large scale of funding actually awarded in a timely 
manner based on completion of project milestones to create 
public-private partnerships that have moved through development 
stages to delivery;  
• durable approach to advancing CCS via practical steps rather 
than jumping straight to full chain integrated projects as in the UK 
(notably, the early ‘FutureGen’ concept, that did seek to do this, 
has struggled to move forward);  
• a stated intention to make creative use of existing clean air 




• adapting existing legislation on boreholes, injection, and liability for 
stored CO2, rather than creating new complex procedures;  
• onshore transportation and storage of CO2 is trusted and accessible 
thanks to four decades of experience with CO2-EOR. 
4.6 Canada has maintained an effort on CCS research for many years. 
Strong groups have been persistent in University of Regina on storage, 
and in Ottawa CANMET on capture.  
4.7 Provinces have great political and fiscal autonomy, and 
Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia have enacted targeted 
carbon taxes and / or a form of Emissions Performance Standard on 
power production.  
4.8 This has catalysed industrial engagement, most notably by SaskPower 
at Boundary Dam where the world's first CCS retrofit onto an operating 
(brown) coal power plant is completing construction, and will be 
operating commercially from end 2013. This project uses existing 
industrial components, and is being delivered for less than the 
projected price; the next project will be 30% less again.  
4.9 In Alberta the QUEST project will reduce emissions from Shell’s oil sand 
upgrading operations; the ACTL pipeline will transport captured CO2 to 
sites of use for Enhanced Oil Recovery and geological storage.  
4.10 All these projects have been enabled by company partnerships with 
very large, and timely, provincial funding, with some federal support. 
The Canadian experience has been marked by a willingness to make 
sure that agreements are reached; with state-owned utilities and 
private companies both displaying a willingness to invest due to the 
need to reduce emissions to maintain operations. 
4.11 China has for many years maintained a watching brief on CCS, well 
aware of its position as the globally largest source of CO2, with poor air 
quality, and reliance on coal. About 20 CCS experiments on capture, 
transport, and injection have been undertaken in China within the last 
five years.  
4.12 In April 2013, the Chinese central government issued a statement 
requesting all provinces to make plans for CCS enactment in the next 
five-year plan 1 . Historical precedents, and SCCS current research 
participation with China, strongly suggest that rigidly enforced top-
down policy, combined with bottom-up provincial and local creativity 
and business insight, will start planning of specific CCS projects in 2014, 
and construction of commercial CCS projects in 2015. This method of 
operation decide-announce-control, is unlike the UK market system 
with its plethora of actors, but will achieve extremely rapid results. 
4.13 UK-funded efforts continue to have influence in China. The NZEC 
process continues to limp along, but a more recent project funded by 
British Embassy Beijing has helped Shaanxi province to identify low-cost, 
high-value CCS options that would link Methanol production to CO2-
EOR. (It is ironic that no similar strategic project has been undertaken in 
                                                 
1  http://cdn.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/default/files/publications/102106/notice-national-development-
reform-commission-ndrc.pdf   
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the UK or Europe). 
5. Practical enabling actions required 
5.1 As a consequence of past failures, DECC is currently overly focussed 
on delivering none, one (or possibly two) projects. This will not be 
sufficient to achieve DECC’s own (limited) stated goals for CCS. New, 
parallel, initiatives are required to address key barriers to investment 
and re-create momentum for CCS deployment. Also required are 
greater clarity on decarbonisation objectives, and a pathway for the 
deployment of CCS on gas-fired power stations (rather than a licence 
to continue un-abated). These tonnages of CO2 provide a clearer 
market driver for CCS and infrastructure deployment into the next 
decade. 
5.2 In light of the above reflections, it is possible to identify a set of actions 
that would help secure the wider deployment of CCS in the UK, and 
assist the achievement of DECC’s own stated aims on cost reduction 
and deployment potential. These must include both practical 
measures and improved policy incentives. 
5.3 It is increasingly recognised that access to CO2 transport and storage is 
an essential enabler of the cost-effective deployment of CCS at scale. 
Projects in the USA and Canada have been able to move forward 
more rapidly in part due to the existence of CO2 pipelines and readily 
available storage options as a result of decades of experience with 
CO2-EOR. What will make UK actors invest in transport, when there is no 
stated ambition of CCS-CO2 for 2025, or 2030? 
5.4 The UK’s CCS Cost Reduction Taskforce 2  has highlighted the 
importance of access to CO2 transport and storage as an essential 
means of both reducing capital costs and effective de-risking of 
investment for follow-on projects. 
5.5  The Central North Sea is the best location geologically (SCCS research) 
with clusters of emitters sharing access to clusters of CO2 storage 
formations 3  Early efforts to prove and validate this CO2 storage are 
essential. Such actions are additionally underlined as a key enabler for 
CCS in the International Energy Agency’s recent CCS Roadmap.4  
5.6  Industrial emitters especially need shared CO2 transport and storage 
infrastructure. These are typically smaller scale facilities that cannot 
bear the costs of a stand-alone point-to-point CCS chain. This analysis 
is supported by the review of costs undertaken for BIS and DECC, 5 and 
by recent studies on behalf of specific industry sectors.6  
                                                 
2   https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ccs-cost-reduction-task-force-final-report  
3  Central North Sea - CO2 Storage Hub: Enabling CCS Deployment in the UK and 
Europe, SCCS, 2012 
4   http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/name,39359,en.html  
5 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/175504/bis-13-745-the-
costs-of-carbon-capture-and-storage-for-uk-industry-a-high-level-review.pdf  
6   See for example the recent strategy for the UK cement industry for reducing 
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5.7  The policy approach to CCS in the UK (and indeed EU) to date has 
been centred on the power sector as a means of undertaking the 
demonstration of CCS at commercial scale (via financing support) to 
be followed by deployment (driven by the carbon price). To date, in 
the absence of a clear and enduring business case or ambition for 
captured CO2/year this process has not delivered.  
5.8 Industrial sectors, such as gas processing, or the production of 
Ammonia or Ethylene provide low-cost and readily available streams 
of CO2. These can be used now to kick-start the testing of CO2 storage 
formations and the development of pipeline networks and shipping 
transport of CO2. 
5.9  CCS can boost low-carbon competitiveness and enable retention of 
tens of thousands of jobs in energy intensive and process industries 
(SCCS research). Building this requires shifting activity away from the 
process-driven procurement of point-to-point ‘demonstration’ projects. 
Strategic anticipation of higher carbon prices and mandatory lower 
carbon intensities, leads to reliable estimates of CO2 stored. Bottom-up 
industry-government partnerships, funded by UK-EMR and/or EU-CCS 
Certificates can catalyse private sector investment in multiple rapid 
CCS projects across industry and power generation sectors. 
5.10 The UK has immense potential value in its offshore CO2 storage 
resource. This comprises about 35% of all CO2 storage for Europe. None 
of the onshore storage for leading industrial states in Europe is currently 
available, due to adverse public opinion. Consequently, the UK has a 
very large opportunity to become the first developer of commercially 
proven, secure, and well-licensed CO2 storage for Europe. Crucial 
gaps in enabling this include the legal ability to import CO2 for storage 
from European or other states, and liability. It is inevitable that the UK 
state must take long-term ownership of stored CO2. Transfer of 
ownership needs to be explicitly guaranteed, and at a date soon after 
completion of an injection project. 
5.11 It is very unclear how this theoretical storage resource will be 
converted commercially into viable storage reserves. At present the 
subsurface expertise, is held by multinational oil companies. This is not 
attracted into UK CO2 storage because of the uncertain investment 
climate, the lack of guaranteed profitability, and the total lack of 
forward projections for CO2 supply as a revenue stream. It is possible to 
envisage state-led investigations of storage, but this will require 
hundreds of millions, or billions, of pounds investment during the next 
decade.  
 
                                                                                                                                             




5.12 Lack of commercially proven storage is likely to become a blockage in 
approving end-to-end commercial CCS projects. Whoever investigates 
CO2 storage offshore, it is essential that the data gained are freely 
available to undertake academic research at no charge, and to be 
used as incentives to attract investigations by additional developers. 
 
5.13  Continued inconsistencies between carbon budgets, gas strategy, 
EMR aims and industrial policy have swamped past signals of a 
growing market for CCS in the UK. The Office of CCS within DECC is 
also responsible for fossil fuel policy, but current policy proposals are 
biased towards continued unabated gas use with CCS noticeable by 
its absence.  
_______________________________________________________________________end 
 
